A Reflection on G.E.M. Anscombe

Among the array of women I count myself blessed to have known & read, G.E.M. Anscombe stands apart from the rest for a number of reasons. In the first place, her works of philosophy inspired not only myself, but also many others whose works I admire (namely, Alasdair MacIntyre). In the second, her subtlety in language & ethics form a helpful theoretical & practical framework. For the purposes of this essay, I will focus on one broad concept within her conceptual framework: intentional action. I will paint a broad picture of Anscombe's concept of intentional action, as a more specific examination deserves a treatment beyond this essay and, perhaps, my current depth.

In section 5 of Intention, Anscombe writes:

"What distinguishes actions which are intentional from those which are not? The answer that I shall suggest is that they are the actions to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application..."

Intentional actions are not the result of external 'causes' which can be observed (like a billiard ball hitting me in the face, causing me to fall backward). Intentional actions fall under the category of "things known without observation" (Intention, sec. 8). For, though one would be foolish to say the brain is not involved in the decision process, one ought not say, "My brain caused me to drive to the store," under Anscombe's account. One might simply say, "I intended to drive to the store. Why? Because I needed to purchase food for the weekend." Intentional actions are not merely predictions, as predictions usually require evidence rather than reasons. For, if I followed someone and observed that they went to the grocery store every Saturday morning, I might predict that they would go to the store the next Saturday morning and be correct, but I would have no knowledge of their intentions & reasons for driving to the store. One Saturday they may have intended to buy food for a party. The next Saturday they may have intended to return in order to ask out the employee they flirted with the previous Saturday.

Anscombe's definition of intentional actions assumes a few criteria, though here I name two: (1) a rational agent intending an action [X intends to do Y], (2) the necessity of reasons rather than observations for the intentional action to be made intelligible to another. The first assumption gives weight to the rational, deliberative faculty of human beings, keeping in line with someone like Aristotle. For Anscombe, causal-determination does not confine human beings. We are rational agents with consciousness & a deliberative faculty which allows us to act intentionally (whether describing the world as it is, or bringing about a desirable state in the world) apart from external causes. Thus, though influenced & affected by the world around us, human beings are still capable of intentional action apart from natural causes. The second assumption opens the world for conceptions of 'the good' or 'goods' as it relates to human action. "I intended to give money to the man in need. Why? Because it is good for me to extend charity to those in need."

With these broad observations & summaries made, I intend to make two points. First, if you want to truly know someone, you must not only look to their actions, but to their reasons for acting. This cultivates a sort of necessary humility in community. For, I know how easy it is to observe an action and categorize it in a familiar way. Imagine a protester. I tend to assume that (most) protesters intend to vocalize their social cause for those who disagree with them or remain unaware. However, after talking with protesters over the years, one reason for protesting stands out among the rest. A mother once told me that, when protesting, she intends to show her daughter the importance of being a person who cares enough to act. Whether or not her daughter learns this from her mother or if protesting is the best way to model action, I would never have known her intentions just from observation. I had to take that intermediate step and ask. (Again, another important reason to ask questions.)

Second, Anscombe's concept of intentional action led her to re-formulate & popularize Virtue Ethics in 20th century philosophy. Virtue Ethics is a theory of normative ethics traced back to Aristotle which approaches ethics from the perspective of character formation rather than moral rules or consequences. For Aristotle, moral virtues are a disposition to act in an excellent way, avoiding the extremes of excess & deficiency. The virtue of Courage is the excellence of character between rashness & cowardice (Aristotle, Nicomahcean Ethics). The purpose of intentional action in turn becomes a question of becoming a certain kind of person.

To conclude, from general observations of Anscombe's theory of intentional actions to two specific points I made relating back to my previous essays, I intend to (ultimately) illustrate one final point I have learned from G.E.M. Anscombe. The project of philosophy, in one sense, concerns immersing yourself in the mind of another human being. In the process, you begin to see the world as they see it. Those we look up to, those whose worlds we enter, will speak into our own world in more ways that we can ever imagine. In reading Anscombe, I invite her to saturate my world with her perspective. And what a voice she brings to my world.

-HGM